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THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL 





PART ONE:  Human Nature and the Sources of Law 
1. Scarcity, Biology, and the Rational Actor 
2. Natural Selection, Deterrence, and Mental Defect 
3. The Science and Law of Race 
 
PART TWO:  Neoclassical Legal Thought 
4. Economics and Law in the Progressive Era 
5. Social Value, Taxation, and Public Finance 
6. From Institutionalism to Legal Realism 
7. Recasting the Common Law: The Management of Risk and 
Relationship 
 
PART THREE:  The Neoclassical Firm and the Formation of Modern 
Business Policy 
8. The Revolution in Corporate Finance 
9. The Separation of Ownership and Control 
10. The Twisted Path to Innovation Policy 
11. Structuralism in Competition Policy 
12. Distribution and Vertical Control 
 
PART FOUR: Neoclassical Public Law 
13. The Substantive Due Process Triumvirate: Health, Safety, and 
Morals 
14. The Waning of Classical Labor Policy 
15. The Regulatory State and Federalism 
 
Epilogue: The New Deal at Bay 
Legal Realism left American legal theory holding an empty bag. It was a 
“destructive movement,” Grant Gilmore lamented in 1951. “We stand amid the 
wreck and ruin of a jurisprudence which cannot be rebuilt.”
1
 To say that law was 
“positive” or “legislative” was consistent with the period’s waning modernism, 
but neither term provided useful content to legal policy. At the same time, Legal 
Realism’s cynicism should not be exaggerated. Although it appeared in popular 
books such as Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind,
2
 many Realists ended 
                                                          
1
 Grant Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251–52 (1951) (reviewing KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH. (New York: Oceana, 1951)). 
2
 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (New York: Brentano’s, 1930). 
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up working in government. For all appearances they were enthusiastic supporters 
of a new age of legislation, redistribution, nonjudicial regulation, and expertise. 
They went from rebellion to establishment in a brief time. 
The Great Depression, the War, and the massive changes brought about by 
government wrought considerable anxiety about law. If law was to be the product 
of policy science, then where was the science? A central question for legal theory 
became whether social science and economics were consistent with democratic 
policymaking, and promised legal institutions that could facilitate growth and 
defensible concepts of liberty, democratic participation, and fairness. The initial 
attempt at a positive answer, driven strongly by Legal Realist values, was a search 
for nonmarket mechanisms of impartial policymaking. When that quest failed, 
economists, legal scholars and later policymakers increasingly returned to more 
market-driven approaches. 
While the period following World War II desperately sought consensus, 
the writing of American intellectuals only showed how elusive consensus could 
be. Influential works of American social history, including Oscar Handlin’s The 
Uprooted and Will Herberg’s Protestant, Catholic, Jew, both undermined the 
myth that the United States was a single great “melting pot,” blending all cultural 
identities into one slightly off-white batter. Herberg settled for the idea of a 
“triple” melting pot, which included Protestants, Catholics, and Jews but slighted 
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, or the variety of other religions practiced by 
millions of Native, Chinese, and other immigrant Americans.
3
 Brown v. Board of 
Education and later Bull Connor’s televised fire hosing of nonviolent 
demonstrators dramatically exposed the nation to the reality of racial conflict.
4
 
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s campaign to root out Communists became a symbol 




Reconstructing and Delimiting the Common Law 
The search for rational consensus in law was driven as much by practical 
considerations as ideological ones. One heroic effort was the Restatement projects 
of the American Law Institute (ALI), which were never intended to be either 
radically revisionist or particularly jurisprudential. They were substantially 
                                                          
3
 WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
SOCIOLOGY (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1955); OSCAR HANDLIN, THE 
UPROOTED: THE EPIC STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRATIONS THAT MADE THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951). 
4
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–1963, at 112–25, 283–84, 
585–94, 767 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). 
5
 For different views of McCarthyism, see RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE 
MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990); M. 
STANTON EVANS, BLACKLISTED BY HISTORY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF SENATOR 
JOE MCCARTHY AND HIS FIGHT AGAINST AMERICA’S ENEMIES (New York: 
Crown Forum, 2007). 
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motivated by professional developments. From its founding in 1878, the 
American Bar Association had made rationalization and uniformity of the law one 
of its objectives.
6
 A year later West Publishing Company inaugurated the 
Regional Reporter System, which large numbers of lawyers began using in the 
1880s and 1890s.
7
 The books were relatively inexpensive and collected the 
important case law of all of the states, organized by region. The relative 
insignificance of the West was clear in how the states were grouped. Kansas, in 
the center of the country, was in the Pacific Reporter. Lawyers now had an 
inexpensive way of comparing their own law with that of nearby states and were 
shocked to discover the degree of diversity.
8
 
The ALI was a relative latecomer to unification. It was founded in 1923 
and directed by William Draper Lewis, a Republican Progressive, friend of 
Theodore Roosevelt, and former Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. The ALI’s stated purpose was “to promote the clarification and 
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs.”
9
 The first 
Restatements included Contracts (1932), Agency (1933), Conflict of Laws (1934), 
Property (1936), Restitution (1937), and Torts (1938–1939). Controversy 
continues about whether the Restatement project was “reformist.”
10
 Some of its 
reporters, such as Harvard’s Joseph Beale who was in charge of Conflict of Laws, 
were ardent anti-reformers.
11
 In addition, the first Restatement grew out of a pre-
Erie v. Tompkins mentality that was inclined to look for a single best legal rule.
12
 
Legal Realists were almost uniformly critical. Leon Green thought that the 
torts Restatement was an exercise in pure formalism.
13
 Yale Law School Dean 
Charles Clark, also an advisor on the Property Restatement, first heaped praise on 
                                                          
6
 See Walker Lewis, The Birth of the American Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 996 (1978); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 305, 541 (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 3d ed. 2005). 
7
 See WILLIAM W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH, 
LEADERSHIP 24 (St. Paul, MN: West, 1969). See also Robert M. Jarvis, John B. 
West: Founder of the West Publishing Company, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 
(2010). 
8
 On the relationship between the organization of the regional reporter system and 
interstate judicial citation, see Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the 
Communication of Precedent among State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 19 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 449 (1985). 
9
 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the 
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law 
Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1 (1923). 
10
 See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the 
American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55, 70–74 (1990); and the 
symposium in 32 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 1 (2007). 
11
 On Beale, see Chapter 7; and Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement 
through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as Its Reputation?, 32 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 39 
(2007). 
12
 On this impulse in the first Restatement, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 170–74 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000). 
13
 Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REV. 582 (1935). 
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the Restatement of Contracts for its assembly of the great legal minds of the day. 
Then he dismantled the entire document, criticizing its excessive formalism and 
its substitution of citation for rigorous analysis. The Institute’s “formula” served 
“to press the fruitful activities of its scholars into the dry pulp of the pontifical and 
vague black letter generalities.”
14
 In an unpublished paper the University of 
Iowa’s Percy Bordwell criticized the Property Restatement’s treatment of future 
interests as “a combination of ancient or rather early medieval history, analytic 
jurisprudence and reportorial legislation but not a statement of the positive law.” 
In a subsequent review of the entire Restatement of Property he predicted its 
failure. “Legislation is legislation and scholarship is scholarship, but the Institute 
is not a legislature and its ways are not those of scholarship.”
15
 Myres McDougal 
said much the same.
16
 
Tulane Legal Realist Mitchell Franklin believed that the Restatements 
were “transitional” documents paving the way for codification.
17
 “At the very 
least, the historic function of the American Law Institute is its role of affording a 
transition from the classic American law of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries to a new American law.” Samuel Williston, Reporter for the 
Restatement on Contracts, observed that “in every other civilized country,” judge-
made law eventually “became unwieldy” and “a code has followed. . . . [M]y own 
belief is that we shall repeat the history of other countries. . . . This Restatement 
. . . will serve as a better foundation for a code.”
18
 
In important ways the Restatement’s drafters looked backward, attempting 
to rationalize a diverse and inconsistent body of legal rules. Grant Gilmore’s 
argument that the ALI’s Restatement agenda was to hold off Legal Realism was 
certainly overstated.
19
 When the Restatements were conceived in the late 1920s, 
the impact of Legal Realism was not yet ominous. The biggest impulse toward 
change came from Holmes’s less radical but nevertheless transformative ideas 
about the purpose and effects of the common law. The Restatement project was 
reformist in this more limited sense. 
                                                          
14
 Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643, 647 
(1933). For the reactions of other Legal Realists at Yale, see LAURA KALMAN, 
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 26–28 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 1986). 
15
 Percy Bordwell, unpublished review, quoted in Clark, supra note 14, at 646–47 n.6; 
Percy Bordwell, Restatement of the Law of Property, 51 HARV. L. REV. 565, 569 
(1938). 
16
 Myres S. McDougal, Book Review, 32 ILL. L. REV. 509 (1937) (reviewing first 
Restatement of Property). 
17
 Mitchell Franklin, The Historical Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement 
as Transitional to Codification, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1934). 
18
 Samuel Williston, Written and Unwritten Law, 17 A.B.A. J. 39, 41 (1931). On the 
Legal Realists’ treatment of Williston, see Mark L. Movsesian, Williston as 
Conservative-Pragmatist, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 137, 138 (2007). 
19
 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 55–68 (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. 
Press, 1974); and Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE 
L.J. 1037 (1961). 
Hovenkamp The Opening of American Law  Page 5 
 Epilogue Feb. 2015 
 
For example, the Williston-directed Restatement of Contracts was strongly 
influenced by Holme’s highly commercial orientation, with its emphasis on 
shared expression rather than internal state of mind, its concern about creating 
proper incentives, its emphasis on remedies, and its generally amoral attitude 
about performance. The provision on nuisance law in the Restatement of Torts, 
drafted just as legislative land use regulation was becoming prominent, was an 
exercise in pure marginalism. “Nontrespassory” harms to the land of others, 
including noise, smoke, excessive water, immoral conduct, and other activities, 
were unlawful, “unless the utility of the actor’s conduct outweighs the gravity of 
the harm.”
20
 This “harm/utility” formulation had never appeared in the case law, 
but it applied a kind of marginalist cost-benefit analysis to private land use 
disputes. The Restatement test was borrowed from the work of another 
Holmesian, Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Smith v Staso Milling Co., which 
had held that nuisance injunctions should be subjected to a utility balancing test.
21
 
In 1942 a Connecticut court became the first to apply this section, concluding that 
the operation of a castor oil plant would not be enjoined simply because a small 
number of workers at neighboring businesses were allergic to castor bean dust. 
This approach required ‘balancing” of competing interests, and in this case the 
castor oil facility had taken every step to limit its emissions. The only alternative 
was to close the plant, but it was under contract to the army and “its product is 
indispensable to the prosecution of the war.” Under the Restatement approach, 
“Regard must be had not only for the interests of the person harmed but also for 
the interests of the actor, for the interests of the community, and, under the 
present circumstances, for the nation.”
22
 
Unlike the reforms later promoted by the Legal Realists, the Restatements 
continued to operate within a framework that acknowledged the centrality of the 
common law and (implicitly) the market, as well as the essential role of the 
courts. Whether or not law was legislative in character, within the Restatement 
conception it was still largely made by judges. In addition, the Restatements 
perpetuated the view that the same body of common law rules could be applied 
across the full range of human activity, without specialized rules for different 
situations. 
By contrast, the Legal Realists were increasingly obsessed with market 
diversity, leading them away from both the Restatement vision and the common 
law itself. They were more supportive of the uniform law approach that was 
already underway when the first Restatements were drafted. The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which had been organized 
in the early 1890s, strove to unify state law by promoting uniform legislation. Its 
                                                          
20
 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 (1939). 
21
 Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927). 
22
 Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 11 Conn. Supp. 82 (Conn. Super. 1942), 
citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 and Comment, Injunction—Nuisance—
Balance of Convenience, 37 YALE L.J. 96 (1927). 
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principal projects were a series of “model acts” that state legislators could adopt.
23
 
Its early achievements were uniform acts in commercial law, including negotiable 
instruments (1896), warehouse receipts (1906), the highly influential Uniform 
Sales Act (1906), and bills of lading (1908). These statutes attempted to 
harmonize the law made in state courts with the “general” commercial law Swift 
v. Tyson (1842) imposed on federal judges in diversity cases. As Justice Story had 
stated in Swift, “The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared 
. . . to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the 
commercial world.”
24
 Story did not foresee the extent to which Swift produced 
divisions between the federal and numerous state courts. By 1908 the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act had been enacted in thirty-five states, and the 
Uniform Sales Act was to have even greater success.
25
 Most of the uniform acts 
were later merged into the Uniform Commercial Code, with its nine distinct 
articles for different areas of commercial activity.
26
 
Drafting on the Uniform Commercial Code began in 1940 and turned into 
a joint effort in 1942. Chastened by its harsh treatment from the Legal Realists, 
the ALI joined in. Karl Llewellyn was the principal drafter, but as the code 
developed it contained little of the radical critique that the Legal Realists had 
envisioned. The UCC was first and foremost a consensus document, deducing the 
law from observed behavior in commercial markets. Llewellyn famously queried 
bankers “If I were a cheque and I arrived in your bank where would I go?”
 27
 The 
UCC’s revisionism was largely limited to deviations from common law rules that 
business persons regarded as unrealistic or as reflecting judicial ignorance of how 
the business world works. For the most part, the market remained alive and well. 
The Restatement Second project was initiated in 1952, after Legal Realism 
had been woven into the legal fabric and state diversity imposed by Erie v. 
Tompkins was well established. The Reporters of the second Restatements were 
largely centrists. They included E. Allan Farnsworth on Contracts, with Arthur 
Linton Corbin as advisor; A. James Casner on Property, and William Prosser and 
John W. Wade on Torts. The greatest changes in mindset lay in the second 
Restatements’ decreasing trust of markets and greater regard for consumers and 
other vulnerable or unsophisticated participants. This resulted in a softening of the 
merchant-oriented rules of contract law, as expressed in the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts (1979). In addition was the formal embrace of strict liability for 
defective products in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977). Grant 
Gilmore saw in these developments a subtle “coming together” between contract 
                                                          
23
 See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY 
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
(St. Paul, MN: West, 1991). 
24
 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
25
 See William Schofield, Uniformity of Law in the Several States as an American Ideal, 
21 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1908). 
26
 Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 (1958). 
27
 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270–73, 313, 
316 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) (quotation on 316). 
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law and tort law. Both threatened an “explosion of liability.” The gradual death of 
nineteenth century tort doctrine that tied liability to fault “matches the decline and 
fall of nineteenth century consideration and contract theory.”
28
 
The Promises and Limitations of Public Governance 
Elite legal thought through the 1960s was dominated by two conflicting trends. 
First was an attempt to justify and define the more legislative approaches that 
Legal Realism and the New Deal promoted. Second was the increasing view that 
legislation is inherently unstable, inefficient, and prone to capture by special 
interests. In the 1960s and after the second of these largely disemboweled the 
first. 
The Transformation of Substantive Due Process: Liberty Rights 
and Special Interest Capture 
The Supreme Court recognized the end of the Lochner era in its 1938 Carolene 
Products decision.
29
 Nevertheless Lochner produced two quite different lingering 
effects. First, although the Court largely stopped second-guessing economic 
legislation, substantive due process analysis of nonmarket liberties continued 
unabated and even expanded. Second, the Supreme Court lost its most important 
tool for combating special interest capture. In this sense, Carolene Product’s 
strong presumption of constitutionality represents the high point of a confidence 
in the legislative process whose defense had yet to be articulated. A generation 
later that view would become the target of public choice and rent-seeking theory, 
which once again picked up the anti-legislation/anti-regulation mantle. 
On the first effect, Lochner became shorthand for a set of essentially 
contract rights against the State. But as Carolene Products itself acknowledged in 
its famous fourth footnote, the theory of preferences that drove Anglo-American 
economic and political theory included other human choices that were not strictly 
economic at all. A significant number of Supreme Court decisions during and 
after the Lochner era recognized liberties outside the realm of ordinary economic 
bargaining. Already in 1890 Brandeis and coauthor Samuel D. Warren argued in 
the Harvard Law Review for a legally protected right to privacy, even though 
Brandeis later became one of Lochner’s strongest critics.
30
 The Supreme Court’s 
Buchanan v. Warley decision (1917) discussed in Chapter 3 hinted at protection 
for noneconomic liberty in its condemnation of residential racial segregation by 
zoning.
31
 Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) found that people had a liberty right to learn a 
foreign language. The Court struck down a World War I–era statute that made it 
unlawful for any school to teach a foreign language to children who had not yet 
reached the eighth grade. The opinion, written by Horseman Justice James 
                                                          
28
 GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 19, at 94–95. 
29
 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). 
30
 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
31
 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
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McReynolds, provided an interesting list of constitutionally protected liberty 
rights: 
. . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
32
 
The Court relied on Lochner, Adkins, and several other substantive due 
process decisions. Two years later, Peirce v. Society of Sisters overturned a state 
statute that closed parochial schools, including Catholic schools.  Justice 
McReynolds wrote the opinion.
33
 In Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) the Court 
recognized a right of procreation, striking down a statute that provided for more-
or-less automatic sterilization of certain convicted criminals.
34
 This liberty right 
took wing in the 1960s, providing greatly expanded constitutional protection for 
an assortment of “fundamental” rights that the text of the Constitution did not 
explicitly embrace. What most of the cases had in common is that significant 
interest groups opposed the conduct, often on moral or religious grounds, but the 
conduct itself was typically consensual and caused little or no injury to third 
parties. Loving v. Virginia recognized a constitutional right to marry, striking 
down statutory bans on interracial marriage (“miscegenation”).
35
 Griswold v. 
Connecticut struck down a statute forbidding the distribution and use of 
contraceptives, in the process recognizing a fundamental right to privacy.
36
 Roe v. 
Wade (1973) recognized and defined a woman’s right to have an abortion.
37
 
Finally, Lawrence v Texas held that the State may not prohibit consensual sexual 
activity between adults of the same sex.
38
 
The second effect of Carolene Products was that its deference toward 
economic regulation largely undermined the Supreme Court’s ability to limit 
“capture” by special interest groups. In retrospect, neither Lochner-style 
economic due process nor Carolene Products’ extreme deference was a good 
vehicle for ferreting out the harmful effects of special interest control of 
legislation. The Lochner approach either condemned legislation without regard to 
capture or assumed capture without proof. Carolene Products went to the 
opposite extreme, largely removing the Court’s ability to limit special interest 
economic legislation unless it ran afoul of an explicit constitutional provision. The 
                                                          
32
 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
33
 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
34
 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
35
 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
36
 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
37
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
38
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986). 
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development of public choice theory, discussed below, was an attempt to recover 
this lost element of substantive due process. 
Carolene Products itself illustrates the problem. The statute in question 
grew out of the same dairy industry campaign that led to the suppression of 
oleomargarine, discussed in Chapter 5.
39
 The “filled milk” provision that the 
Court upheld prohibited sellers from inserting non-milk oils into their milk 
products. Carolene’s product, then called “Milnut,” contained evaporated milk 
with a small amount of coconut oil. The mixture whipped very easily, thus 
making it a substitute for pure cream. The product is sold to this day under the 
name “Milnot,” owned by J.M. Smucker’s, Inc. It contains considerably less fat 
than whipping cream and no saturated fat. From the beginning, the principal 
purpose of the legislation was not to protect consumers from a harmful product, 
but rather to protect the dairy industry from competition. 
Legal Interpretation and Judicial Review 
One important legacy of Legal Realism was the belief that all of law, including 
common law, is essentially public in character. As a result the traditional 
distinction between private and public law is either porous or untenable. In 
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) the Supreme Court held that mere judicial enforcement 
of a private racially restrictive covenant implicates “state action” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, suggesting that even common law contracts could be 
“public.”
40
 The courts declined to jump the precipice, however, and held Shelley 
closely to its facts. In 1956 the Supreme Court refused to apply it in Black v. 
Cutter Laboratories, which upheld judicial enforcement of a private arbitration 
board’s dismissal of a worker for membership in the Communist Party.
41
 The 
Court rejected Mabel Black’s protest that judicial enforcement of the decision 
violated her First Amendment rights, finding no state action but only a private 
labor agreement. In 1959 the Legal Realist Leon Green wrote that even tort law 
was “Public Law in Disguise.”
42
 A year later, however, Ronald Coase would 
declare in “The Problem of Social Cost” how utterly private the law could be.
43
 
Green’s article has largely been forgotten, while Coase’s is the most cited of all 
time. 
A second legacy of Legal Realism was the belief that law is fundamentally 
democratic and legislative, but also complex and best interpreted by experts. One 
influential attempt to reconstruct a practical and lawyerly defense of legal 
interpretation was Henry Hart and Albert M. Sack’s book of teaching materials 
entitled The Legal Process.
44
 The book came out in 1958 in a mimeographed 
                                                          
39
 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397. 
40
 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
41
 Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas 
and Black dissented. 
42
 Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
43
 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (actually published in 1961). See the discussion infra. 
44
 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed., 1958). 
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“tentative edition,” which Harvard Law School distributed free upon request to 
interested law teachers. Thus it remained, widely used but with minimal revision, 
for nearly forty years until Foundation Press published it even though it had 
become conceptually obsolete.
45
 The Legal Process had been intended for a 
course in legislation, but evolved to include administrative decision-making and 
even some common law approaches. Its central message was that law could be 
improved through increased institutional competence, greater transparency, and 
“reasoned elaboration” designed to discover the law’s underlying purpose. Legal 
policy for Hart and Sacks is inherently democratic and legislative, but statutes are 
never sufficiently complex to describe the entire reality to which they apply. They 
are the products of political compromise, ambiguous and open-ended. The job of 
the expert decision-maker is to use interpretative tools in order to locate a 
statute’s “meaning” and then apply it to the case at hand. 
Meanwhile, Henry Hart’s other coauthor Herbert Wechsler wrote “Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law,” intended both to defend and limit the Supreme 
Court’s counter-democratic decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
46
 Wechsler 
believed that Brown adequately elaborated its conclusion that separate public 
schools were “inherently unequal,” but he faulted the Court’s subsequent and 
unelaborated decisions desegregating municipally owned bathhouses and publicly 
sponsored operas.
47
 Unlike schools, these facilities were voluntary rather than 
mandatory and thus did not fit within Brown’s rationale without further 
explanation. Looking back to the era of substantive due process, Wechsler saw 
that the Court’s willingness to permit state restrictions on labor unions but 
unwillingness to permit labor-protective legislation as another instance of 
superficially non-neutral decision-making. For Wechsler as for Hart and Sacks, 
the key to principled lawmaking was for the courts to identify some neutral 
rationale that justified differential treatment and then provide a reasoned 
explanation. Unstated but lurking in the background, of course, was that “neutral” 
principles existed, could be discovered, and even yield determinate results, if only 
enough process and elaboration were applied. One harsh critique was that 
Wechsler’s “neutral” principles did not even reach to mandatory desegregation of 
public facilities, a burden that Wechsler carried to his grave.
48
 
                                                          
45
 HENRY M. HART, JR., ALBERT M. SACKS, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1994). See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 2031 (1994). 
46
 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1959). Hart and Wechsler’s classic law school casebook is HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(Brooklyn, NY: Foundation Press, 1st ed., 1953). 
47
 Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches and bath 
houses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per 
curiam) (city-sponsored operas). 
48
 Two forceful critiques, a generation apart, are Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, 
The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 
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Yale professor Alexander Bickel concluded from his own exhaustive 
study of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Brown desegregation decision was 
neither explicitly contemplated nor foreclosed by the Amendment’s drafters and 
proponents. As a result the decision was permissible and attained further 
legitimacy because it was unanimous.
49
 Given that the Court had discretion to go 
either way and that its result was socially just, Bickel wholeheartedly supported it. 
In The Least Dangerous Branch, a constitutional law classic that cemented 
Bickel’s position as one of his field’s greatest scholars, Bickel wove a powerful, 
prolegislative argument that judicial review is disruptive to democratic process 
and must be used sparingly.
50
 He brought the terms “countermajoritarian 
difficulty” and “passive virtues” into constitutional discourse, emphasizing that 
judicial review can readily be overused and in the process can threaten democratic 
institutions and undermine public confidence in government. The Court must 
search relentlessly for non-constitutional alternatives and always write decisions 
striking down statutes as narrowly as possible. 
The Critique of Political Markets 
Hart, Sacks, Wechsler, and Bickel all understood that legislation is imperfect and 
incomplete. They were nonetheless committed to the view that both legislation 
and administrative law were worth preserving. Increasingly after the 1950s, 
however, critics from law, economics, and political science all began to see 
legislative and administrative processes as so deeply flawed that they rarely reveal 
the social will. Regulation in particular seemed very costly in relation to results, a 
point that James M. Landis brought home in his 1960 Report on Regulatory 
Agencies to president-elect Kennedy. Landis’s report was influential because 
during the heyday of Legal Realism he had been the author of an important and 
far more optimistic book, The Administrative Process.
51
 
Landis had been the first Chairman of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, as well as Dean of the Harvard Law School. His 1938 book on The 
Administrative Process was intended to defend the infant administrative state 
from some of its harshest critics, including the American Bar Association and 
older Progressives such as Roscoe Pound, who believed the agencies threatened 
absolutism and arbitrary decision-making.
52
 Roosevelt’s own Brownlow 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1960); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
49
 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). 
50
 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
51
 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1938); JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE 
PRESIDENT-ELECT (U.S.G.P.O, 1960). See THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF 
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. 
LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984). 
52
 See Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 219 (1986); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World 
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Committee Report (1937) had concluded that administrative agencies were a 
“headless” fourth branch of government that lacked democratic accountability, 
and required greater supervision from the executive branch.
53
 Although Landis’s 
lectures were given just after the Court-packing controversy, most of Roosevelt’s 
new Court appointments had not yet been made and the current Supreme Court 
was hostile. The year before an opinion by Justice Sutherland had likened the 
truncated procedures of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Landis’s own 
agency, to the “intolerable abuses of the Star Chamber.”
54
 
Landis’s defense of the administrative state must be read against this 
background. He was in essence writing a brief. He defended agencies as more 
flexible than courts, and more able to command expertise, and acknowledged that 
they needed to be accountable to the designated branches of government. He also 
argued that agency rule-making could make them more proactive, seeing 
problems in advance rather than waiting for litigation, as courts must do. 
Landis’s Report to president-elect Kennedy twenty-two years later 
revealed how much the gleam had left the rose. Landis lamented that agencies 
were much costlier than anticipated, and that they lacked coordination among one 
another and often issued inconsistent orders. Effective rule-making was often 
undermined by industry interference: “the regulatees have become the 
regulators.”
55
 What is strikingly absent from Landis’s Report, however, is any 
suggestion that a greater range of business firm activities be removed from agency 
control. There may have been problems, but he did not see deregulation as a 
solution. 
Landis was hardly the first to note the problem of special interest capture 
of government process. As noted previously, Lochner-era decisions often 
assumed it. In fact, American political thinkers had been aware of it since James 
Madison expressed concern that interest groups (“factions’) would hijack the 
government for their own ends. Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10 that 
guarding against factions required bothcohesiveness among  citizens and checks 
and balances incorporated into the structure of government.
56
 
A hallmark of Progressivism was its faith in grass roots political markets 
and a belief that the solution to special interest problems was broader and more 
direct involvement by voters. The muckraking journalists of the early twentieth 
century largely saw corruption and lack of popular involvement as going hand in 
                                                                                                                                                              
War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: 
THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 185, 186 (Daniel R. Ernst & 
Victor Jew eds., Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 
53
 See Report of The President’s Committee on Administrative Management in the 
Government of the United States (U.S.G.P.O., 1937); and Donald R. Brand, The 
President as Chief Administrator: James Landis and the Brownlow Report, 123 
POL. SCI. Q. 69 (2008); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245 (2001). 
54
 Jones v. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 28 (1936). 
55
 LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 51, at 19, 50. 
56
 The Federalist, No. 10 (Nov. 22, 1787) (Madison). 
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hand. That was the principle theme of Progressive muckraker Lincoln Steffans’s 
1906 book The Struggle for Self-Government. His better-known book, The Shame 




Progressive Era social scientists firmly believed that government reform 
was an essential goal of their disciplines. In his departing address as President of 
the American Political Science Association, Woodrow Wilson defined political 
science as “the accurate and detailed observation of these processes by which the 
lessons of experience are brought into the field of consciousness, transmuted into 
active purposes, put under the scrutiny of discussion, sifted, and at least given 
determinate form in law.”
58
 Soon after he left Princeton to become governor of 
New Jersey and then U.S. president. 
“Law” was the operative word in Wilson’s statement, but law coming 
from where? Wilson believed that voters were too unsophisticated to make 
difficult policy decisions directly. Nevertheless, he was committed to broad voter 
participation in the election of wise and honest officials.
59
 During his presidency 
the Constitution was augmented by the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided 
for direct election of U.S. Senators, and the Nineteenth Amendment, which 
extended the vote to women. Wilson himself was initially opposed to women’s 
suffrage, but ostensibly changed his mind after observing the role of women in the 
war effort.
60
 By contrast to the Progressives, the political philosophy of the New 
Deal was much more inclined toward governance by administrative agencies, 
with much of the decision-making delegated to experts, and with less direct forms 
of political accountability. 
These visions of the relationship between democracy and good 
government all had their critics. The interest group theory that developed in the 
young discipline of political science was preoccupied with legal institutions at 
every level. Reacting to the overly abstract and optimistic visions of democracy 
that characterized the nineteenth-century study of government, the new generation 
called for more realism and harsher critiques. Arthur Bentley’s highly influential 
Process of Government (1908) examined how interest groups affected 
government decision-making within Congress, the presidency, courts, state 
legislatures, and even political parties. He subtitled his book “A Study of Social 
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 LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO 
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 Woodrow Wilson, The Law and the Facts, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 (1911). 
59
 See SHELTON STROMQUIST, REINVENTING “THE PEOPLE”: THE PROGRESSIVE 
MOVEMENT, THE CLASS PROBLEM, AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 
(Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2006). 
60
 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 
n.152 (1991). 
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 The influential leftist historian Charles Beard argued in 1913 that the 
U.S. Constitution represented the triumph of commercial interests and those 
owning mainly personal property, as over against more agrarian interests whose 
wealth was largely in land. Beard attempted to show first that the membership of 
the Constitutional Convention was disproportionately composed of owners of 
securities, traders and shippers, and other forms of commercial wealth; and 
second that the Constitution protected these interests by devices such as 
restrictions on state debtor relief laws.
62
 
Interest group theory also played an important role in the writing of the 
economic institutionalists and Legal Realists. Their work also reflected an urge to 
use economics and law as tools of reform. In mainstream economics resources 
flow without friction to the place where they will do the most good. In the real 
world, the institutionalists argued, organizations and special interests always get 
in the way. The most influential institutionalist attack on collective decision 
processes was Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation, which was 
fundamentally about the power of management to wrest control from 
shareholders, who were much more diffuse and had smaller individual stakes.
63
 
Significantly, however, Berle and Means saw legislation as a cure, as if it could 
somehow be immune from special interest influence. 
An important characteristic of institutionalism was its identification of the 
specific institutions that make public decisions, rather than the more abstract 
approaches that characterized neoclassical economics. Corporations are different 
from courts, which are different from agencies, which are different from 
legislatures. Institutionalist economist John R. Commons wrote a posthumously 
published book entitled The Economics of Collective Action, concerned with how 
organized group action could leverage power in nongovernmental institutional 
settings, such as bargaining between employers and employees.
64
 
The heavily empirical approach championed by Berle, Means, and 
Commons explained the value of institutionalism and Legal Realism, but also 
suggests why they ultimately failed. Their strength lay in their study of specific 
institutions in the real world, but they too often became bogged down in detail. 
Critics complained about the lack of methodological rigor in work that variously 
                                                          
61
 ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL 
PRESSURES (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1908). See DANIEL T. RODGERS, 
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called upon exhaustive example, political theory, history, and even Darwin and 
Freud to explain group political behavior.
65
 
The study of public decision-making became more formalized in post-
institutionalist writing by political scientists and sociologists. Of particular 
importance were C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956); Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); and Robert A. Dahl’s Who Governs? 
(1961).
66
 These books emphasized the role of government as umpire among 
competing interest groups. Writing on a backdrop of utilitarian political 
philosophy, their authors examined the ways that interest groups could influence 
outcomes and in some cases distort true community choices in existing 
institutions. 
The explosion of economics literature on social choice in the 1960s defies 
description in a few paragraphs.
67
 In contrast to the political scientists, economists 
developed abstract but analytically more rigorous accounts of collective decision- 
making under strictly marginalist principles. The term “public choice” entered the 
legal literature in reference to works by Kenneth Arrow, Mancur Olson, James 
Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock, all of whom were trained economists. As a 
matter of pure theory, Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values may be the 
most important to economists and political theorists. The books with the greatest 
policy influence, however, were James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The 
Calculus of Consent (1962) and Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action 
(1965). Olson’s formalization of interest group theory most influenced the set of 
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Public choice theory was as cynical about legislation and regulation as 
Legal Realism was about the common law. The economic critique was 
beguilingly simple. Voluntary exchanges are efficient because everyone gains, 
provided that nonparties are not injured. But democracies in which each person 
gets a vote make very few decisions unanimously. When is a decision for the 
social good if some people oppose it? Prior to the rise of ordinalism in the 1930s 
neoclassical economists thought they had a partial answer: society is better off 
when resources are transferred from the wealthy to the poor, even if some wealthy 
object. That answer was never complete, however, because not all disputes divide 
the poor and the wealthy. In any event, by the 1950s most economists were 
rejecting any view that justified involuntary wealth transfers by engaging in 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
The formal theory of political markets began with the Marquis de 
Condorcet’s discovery in the late eighteenth century that voting processes are 
prone to failure of equilibrium, or “cycling.” When votes are not unanimous we 
cannot be assured of a stable outcome. To illustrate, suppose the symbol p means 
“prefer” as between two alternatives—for example “ApB” means that a voter 
prefers choice A over choice B. Then imagine a simple society with three voters 
and three choices, A, B, and C. The voters have these preferences: 
Voter 1: ApBpC 
Voter 2: BpCpA 
Voter 3: CpApB 
In a majority vote between alternative A and B, A wins because both 
Voters 1 and 3 prefer A over B. Then, in a vote between A, the winner, and C, C 
wins. Voters 2 and 3 prefer C over A. Thus the “social” decision at this point 
indicates that C wins, because a majority prefers C over A, and A over B. A 
minimum condition of rational behavior in the neoclassical framework is 
“transitivity,” which means that if an individual prefers X over Y and Y over Z, 
she must prefer X over Z. However, in the above illustration if a vote is taken on 
C versus B, B wins because Voters 1 and 2 prefer B over C. At that point we 
could start over again and have a vote between B and A, but that would place us 
in an infinite cycle. In sum, the “social” choice of as few as three individuals on 
as few as three issues can be “irrational,” in the sense that it results in endless 
cycling with no final outcome. The conclusion: it may be impossible to identify 
the correct “social choice” from one person/one vote systems. Kenneth Arrow 
formalized this observation and derived a mathematical proof, usually called the 
“General Impossibility Theorem,” or “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,” that the 
aggregation of votes cannot yield a stable social choice unless the vote is 
unanimous. 
Whether Arrow’s analysis applies to government policy depends on 
whether the policy incorporates shared rules that serve to force consensus. The 
vote-cycling story assumes that preferences are “naked,” in the sense that each 
person chooses what she wants without constraint. However, if we had three 
scientists or even three appellate judges applying a given body of rules, their 
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choices would be much more constrained and cycling would occur far less 
often.
69
 The Progressive and New Deal reliance on experts assumed that decision-
makers were applying theory to policy, and not simply asserting naked 
preferences. Further, the degree of determinacy need not be all that great. For 
example, the Supreme Court is an ideologically diverse body that decides 
controversial cases in which the law is usually “soft.” If their votes were simply 
random they would be unanimous in 1 out of 256 cases. In fact, above 30 percent 
of the Supreme Court’s decisions are unanimous. 
The Calculus of Consent is less technical than Arrow’s work. It also 
rejected interpersonal comparisons of utility and acknowledged that unanimous 
choices are true social choices. Realizing that unanimity is impossible to achieve, 
Buchanan and Tullock explored whether the unanimity rule can be relaxed. Rules 
that require less than unanimous decision-making impose costs on naysayers, but 
sometimes an outcome resembling unanimity is possible if “side payments” 
compensate the losers.
70
 In that case everyone would be at least as well off—a 
condition that Richard Epstein developed in an important 1985 book as a theory 
of eminent domain.
71
 The Calculus of Consent included a complex analysis of 
“logrolling,” or vote trading in legislative bodies, to illustrate its harmful and 
beneficial uses. 
The Logic of Collective Action appealed to a broad audience from the day 
it was published. Although Mancur Olson located interest group theory squarely 
inside of neoclassical economics, he did it in a nontechnical way that was more 
accessible than Arrow and less strident than Buchanan and Tullock. Olson relied 
heavily on the economic theory of cartels.
72
 A cartel attempts to achieve the 
monopoly rate of price and output. However, an individual firm can make more 
by increasing output and shaving price. If everyone does that, however, the cartel 
will fall apart. Cartels work much better when they are small and well disciplined, 
with a set of common interests. Difficulties of detection and discipline in larger 
groups enable an individual member to “free ride” on the efforts of others or even 
defect. One problem with very large groups, Olson observed, is that the additional 
return produced by the efforts of each individual member is very small. By 
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contrast, in the very small group the defection of a single member can throw the 
entire group into disarray. 
Olson’s book reached two very powerful conclusions. The first one, less 
emphasized in the later literature, is that excessive free riding leads to 
underinvestment in public goods, or infrastructure. Each individual would rather 
not contribute anything at all, trusting that others will take care of the problem.
73
 
Olson’s second theory, for which his book became famous, was that small and 
well-organized interest groups are much more effective in getting their message 
across than large groups. Much of the subsequent public choice attack on 
regulation was based on this premise—namely that regulation tends to benefit 
regulated firms, who are few in number and well organized, rather than their 
customers, who are likely to be numerous, diverse, and disorganized. 
The most powerful rhetoric of the deregulation movement in the late 
1970s and after was that regulation too often succumbed to “capture” by the 
regulated at the expense of the more general public. For example, Olson’s theory 
provided a powerful explanation for why so many regulatory agencies hear the 
voices of regulated firms more clearly than those of consumers, -- why, for 
example, intellectual property law has always been so protective of producers. It 
also explains why individuals vote for state right-to-work laws in order to avoid 
the individual costs of joining a union, even though their act undermines 




Public choice theory has made the Supreme Court more sensitive to the 
role of interest groups in obtaining legislation. Justice Scalia has frequently 
spoken of statutes as the results of compromise among competing interest 
groups.
75
 Nevertheless, such recognition sometimes turns the Court in surprising 
directions. For example, the important Chevron decision in 1984 recognized that 
statutes often reflect ambiguity resulting from deals between competing interest 
groups. The Court then ruled that the regulatory agency should be free to adopt 
any reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
76
 The result, which 
occurred during the early years of the deregulation movement, has been to give 
agencies enormous discretion to make rules in areas where Congress has not 
spoken precisely on the issue. 
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The Rehabilitation of Private Markets 
Public choice theory was not the only onslaught against the New Deal regulatory 
State. Beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1960s neoclassical 
economics gradually rehabilitated private markets, eventually concluding that 
most of them worked tolerably well, if not perfectly. The Chicago School moved 
from being a “lunatic fringe,” as Richard A. Posner once paraphrased what its 
detractors called it,
77
 to mainstream legitimacy. The Coasean revolution directed 
many writers in economics and law to the study of very tiny markets. In the 
process Coase’s writing served to undermine the privileged position that Legal 
Realism had given regulation over the common law. 
The New Learning in Industrial Economics 
The high point of antitrust interventionism in the United States was in the 1950s 
and 1960s, reflecting an almost paranoid concern with industrial 
“concentration”—or small number of firms in a market. In 1950 Congress 
expanded the coverage of the anti-merger law, § 7 of the Clayton Act. Over a 
fifteen-year period policymakers offered a series of proposals for 
“deconcentrating” American industry by breaking up large firms. A final serious 
proposal offered by Michigan senator Philip A. Hart was presented to the Senate 
in 1972 as the Industrial Reorganization Act. The proposal was supported by 
Ralph Nader, whose study group report, The Closed Enterprise System, argued 
that the economy was dominated by noncompetitive market structures that made 
it impossible for smaller firms to compete.
78
 
None of these bills passed. Increasingly the dominant writing in industrial 
economics, together with legal scholarship by such writers as Robert H. Bork and 
Richard A. Posner, began a general rehabilitation of the market.
79
 Questioning 
almost every premise of the structuralist school, the new learning largely restored 
the classical faith that high prices would encourage new firms to come into a 
market, making durable monopoly rare.
80
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In 1974 a group of influential economists and lawyers met at Airlie House 
in Warrenton, Virginia, in a conference that signaled a turning point in antitrust 
and industrial policy. The proceedings were published as Industrial 
Concentration: The New Learning. That book, widely used in antitrust and 
industrial policy classes for two decades, indicated just how much dominant 
thinking about the “monopoly problem” had shifted. Essays by Chicago School 
scholars John S. McGee, Yale Brozen, Harold Demsetz, and Posner argued that 
concentration did not threaten competition nearly as much as the structuralists had 
assumed. Large firm size was driven mainly by economic efficiency, and 
competition could be robust with many fewer firms than the now ageing Harvard 
School had supposed. The Airlie House conference also heard protests from 
defenders of structuralism, but increasingly these voices were drowned out.
81
 
Micromarkets and the Common Law: Coase 
Few twentieth-century scholars have had more influence on legal thought than 
Ronald H. Coase (1910–2013). He was born in a London suburb where his 
parents worked as telegraph operators for the British post office. His formative 
economic education and what legal education he had were at the London School 
of Economics in the 1920s and early 1930s, during its heyday under the 
leadership of Lionel Robbins.
82
 His 1937 essay on The Nature of the Firm lay 
ignored for a generation, but later it had a pervasive influence on thinking about 
the structure of the business firm and the rationales for vertical integration.
83
  
Coase moved to the United States in the 1950s and taught at SUNY Buffalo, and 
then at the Universities of Virginia and Chicago. His most famous article, The 
Problem of Social Cost, was published in 1961 while he was at Virginia, whose 
economics department was second only to Chicago’s in attempting to forge free 




Coase’s foil was Arthur C. Pigou, Alfred Marshall’s successor as 
professor of economics at Cambridge University. In The Economics of Welfare, 
Pigou addressed the problem of “externalities,” or harmful effects that a person’s 
activities have on others. The idea did not originate with Pigou, or for that matter, 
not even with economists. By the 1910s the Supreme Court’s liberty of contract 
jurisprudence had a well-developed theory of externalities as a justification for 
regulation.  For example, regulation of working conditions might be justified if 
unrestricted contracting affected other people—the “healthful quality of the 
bread,” as Justice Peckham put it in Lochner (1905).
85
 As Coase presented 
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Pigou’s position, the government needed to intervene in such cases in order to 
protect bystander victims. Pigou and later Coase used the example of a railroad 
whose trains emit sparks that might start fires injuring neighboring farmers.
86
 
Coase famously argued that government intervention may not be necessary 
because private bargaining could address such problems. 
What became the most famous actual case in The Problem of Social Cost 
was a nuisance law dispute involving Dr. Octavius Sturges, a London physician 
who specialized in pneumonia and other diseases of the lungs. Sturges shared a 
duplex with Frederick Horatio Bridgman, confectioner to the Queen. Bridgman 
used a large mechanical mortar and pestle to break down chocolate and other 
substances. Dr. Sturges complained that the pounding machine interfered with his 
ability to diagnose patients with his stethoscope.
87
 Against the argument that this 
dispute required State intervention, Coase argued that Sturges and Bridgeman 
could simply have bargained with each other over Bridgman’s continued use of 
the mortar and pestle. For example, if Sturges valued the right to be free of the 
pounding by £100, while Bridgeman valued the right to use his machine by only 
£80, then use of the machine would end. If these values were reversed, however, 
then the use would continue. Coase concluded that in a well-functioning market 
the two parties would bargain their way to an “efficient” result and that this the 
outcome would depend strictly on relative values and not on who might win the 
lawsuit. 
The Problem of Social Cost is the most cited law review article of all time. 
Every nook and cranny of Coase’s argument has been explored. Coase made a 
powerful argument that legal entitlements can be traded in markets just as much 
as ordinary products and services. For example, the right to pollute or to be free of 
pollution is tradeable. As in any market, unrestrained trading ordinarily produces 
efficient results, something that cannot always be said of government 
intervention. Many areas of law that were thought to be “public” or “quasi-
public,” such as environmental or eminent domain law, could be reconceived as 
“private” to the extent that they reflected bargaining disputes among affected 
persons. 
Coase’s concern was with very small markets. Sturges v. Bridgman 
involved bargaining between a single physician and confectioner over the use of a 
single two-unit house. To the extent that Coase turned the problem of legal 
disputes into one of bargaining, it was at a microscopic level, not the large areas 
that are typically covered by legislation such as zoning laws. Later economists in 
this tradition, such as Oliver E. Williamson, wrote about economic decision-
making within a single firm, including decisions about whether to make or buy 
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inputs and of specialized contract practices with suppliers or distributors.
88
 The 
“Coase Theorem,” as Chicago economist George J. Stigler later named it, is 
subject to many qualifications and variations. Efficient outcomes might be more 
elusive if bargainers have high bargaining (“transaction”) costs. Some disputes 
might involve many more than two bargainers, making efficient outcomes more 
difficult to reach. For example, if the spark-emitting railroad is not guilty of a 
nuisance but the aggregated farmers along the railroad’s path have the greater 
value, then the farmers must pay off the railroad. Organizing them and getting 
them to agree on each farmer’s contribution could be heroic, particularly if they 
differ in size, amount of injury, and so on. Each one individually might not want 
to pay anything at all, assuming that others would bear the burden. Mancur Olson 
would make this very argument just a few years later in The Logic of Collective 
Action, but it also applies to the Coasean situation if many bargainers are 
involved. 
The Coasean literature includes both supporters and detractors, and within 
the fields of both economics and law.
89
 James Buchanan, coauthor of The 
Calculus of Consent, and Harold Demsetz debated the relative costs and benefits 
of private bargaining compared to government intervention.
90
 Another debate 
concerned “alienability,” or the transferability of legal entitlements. Coase’s 
argument depended on people’s ability to negotiate to the efficient solution by 
waiving their legal claims, something that the common law permits but statutes 
such as the zoning laws typically do not.
91
 
The Problem of Social Cost had a significant impact on 1960s’ and 1970s’ 
thinking about environmental law, natural resources, and land use planning, all of 
which were subject to extensive regulation. In law school casebooks on property, 
“private” land use restrictions moved from the back burner to the front. 
Economically inclined law teachers drew blackboard pictures of polluting 
smokestacks and downwind homes, asking students about the relative merits of 
regulation or private bargaining to address environmental policy. Property 
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scholars compared the rights created by zoning statutes with negotiable common 
law nuisance rules or private covenants.
92
 
In 1964 Allen Kneese wrote his now classic book The Economics of 
Regional Water Quality Management, relying on Coase in a chapter dedicated to 
the use of private markets to make water allocation decisions.
93
 Environmental 
policy turned increasingly to “market based” pollution control systems that 
permitted firms to bid for pollution rights or even trade them.
94
 Under these 
systems the Environmental Protection Agency set “gross” standards for particular 
pollutants. Companies could bid for the rights to discharge them, presumably 
assigning them to the producer whose output was the most valuable or who had 
the highest pollution reduction costs. 
Similar developments occurred in accident law, as Chapter 7 recounts. 
Drawing on Coase, Guido Calabresi suggested that liability for automobile 
accidents should be assigned to the person who would have obtained the 
obligation if bargaining had been possible—the “cheapest cost avoider,” in the 
terminology of law and economics. Calabresi’s and Richard A. Posner’s work 
also called for rethinking of the appropriate roles of negligence and strict liability 
in torts and gave support to the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts, 




Neither Coase, Posner, nor Calabresi single-handedly invented law and 
economics. Economic analysis of law was well developed in the earlier history of 
legal thought, as portions of this book discuss. The Journal of Law and 
Economics was established at the University of Chicago about six years before 
Coase moved there and three years before The Problem of Social Cost was 
published. Posner’s ground-shifting book entitled Economic Analysis of Law was 
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 He was a law student at Harvard when Social Cost was 
published and accepted his first academic position at Stanford Law School in 
1968, focusing on antitrust law. He moved to the University of Chicago in 1969 
and became an appellate judge when Ronald Reagan appointed him in 1981. 
Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law expanded the domain of law and 
economics to nearly every legal area. Posner included lengthy sections on the 
common law, family law, regulation, corporate and securities law, tax and wealth 
distribution, constitutional law, and federalism. His early work became associated 
with the position that economic efficiency is the most defensible goal for legal 
rules. Redistribution may be appropriate too, but it should be explicit and direct 
rather than disguised in costly regulations or subsidies. 
Coase and Posner have become symbols of everything that people both 
love and hate about law and economics. Some legal scholars were put off by the 
extent to which Posner marshaled arguments based on expected utility for every 
conceivable legal problem, including such things as marriage and prostitution, as 
well as his willingness to assume that competition did or could exist in many 
areas where it seemed impossible to achieve.
97
 But Posner has proven to be a 
nimble scholar. An important key to the success of his work, and to the law and 
economics movement generally, has been an ability to marshal its insights into a 
positive and evolving program for legal reconstruction, something that other 
twentieth-century critiques including Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies 
were never able to accomplish. Perhaps the legal achievement that comes closest 
is John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971), whose powerful anti-utilitarian 
argument for increasing expected welfare by improving the lot of the worst off 
was particularly influential in the 1980s and 1990s. Although Rawls’s book has 
been cited more frequently than Coase’s Social Cost, Rawls did not make nearly 
as dramatic a jump from classes in legal theory to applied law. 
The (Partial) Dismantling of the Regulatory State 
By the 1970s a consensus was emerging that much regulation was excessive, 
poorly designed, or both. First, industrial economists increasingly came to believe 
that markets were more robust than previously thought and required government 
intervention less frequently. Second, public choice theory appeared to make a 
strong case that regulation too often led to capture, benefitting regulated firms 
rather than the consumers it was declared to protect.
98
 Regulation seemed much 
more costly than anticipated and produced less appealing results. In 1982 
appellate judge Stephen G. Breyer, who had been a professor of administrative 
law at Harvard Law School and would later become Associate Justice of the 
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Supreme Court, wrote a highly influential book, Regulation and Its Reform.
99
 The 
book was all the more influential because Breyer was not a member of the 
Chicago School or even a fellow traveler. He was a Democrat, appointed to the 
bench by Jimmy Carter and elevated to the Supreme Court by Bill Clinton. Breyer 
illustrated how certain markets, such as trucking and air travel, had been 
“mismatches” from the start because these industries were either structured 
competitively or capable of being made so. Indeed, a principal effect of trucking 
regulation had been to make it nearly impossible for new firms to enter a market 
in which entry should be quite easy. 
Mancur Olson’s thesis about interest group capture, the Coasean literature 
on bargaining alternatives to regulation, and the social choice/voting literature all 
coalesced in the 1960s and 1970s to make a powerful intellectual case for 
dismantling New Deal regulation. But very likely the most important factor was a 
poor track record, including the high public costs of administration and the even 
higher private costs of compliance. Small businesses and new entrants 
complained that the regulatory process favored large firms. Consumer benefits 
were often illusory. In addition, as Landis’s 1960 Report had already pointed out, 
there were way too many “jurisdictional” squabbles, inconsistent mandates, or 
other costly trade-offs, often caused by self-serving intervention by Congress. 
Bruce Ackerman and William T. Hassler confirmed many of these 
problems in Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981), a now classic discussion of how 
political processes can corrupt good intentions. As one reviewer put it, the book 
revealed “power-conscious congressmen, scheming staff persons, intrepid 
industry lobbyists, overzealous environmentalists, and insecure bureaucrats who 
connive, cajole, and caress one another into supporting a law and a set of 
regulations that may actually produce an increase in the nation’s air pollution at 
an enormous cost to businesses and taxpayers.”
100
 
Deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines produced lower consumer 
prices and greatly increased the entry of new firms. In other areas it had less 
success. Most occurred in stages, and pinpointing a single year in which an 
industry was “deregulated” is impossible.
101
 Trucking and railroad regulation 
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were low-hanging fruit because the industries were competitively structured. 
Deregulation began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, just at the end of the Carter 
administration.
102
 The Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 1887 and 
America’s oldest major federal regulatory agency, was dismantled in 1995. 
Passenger air travel regulation under the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
was a true maze of price regulation, restrictions on service, and subsidies for 
struggling carriers. The CAB’s explicit concern was “unfair” competition, but that 
came to mean any competition at all. For example, the CAB made it illegal for 
Aloha Airlines to include rental cars in traveler vacation packages, because this 
would give Aloha an “unfair advantage” over its competitor Hawaiian Airlines.
103
 
One wonders how a practice can be anticompetitive when customers like it and 
any firm can do it. During the high point of CAB regulation in the late 1970s, 
airlines were forbidden from offering movies, and even the size of the sandwich 
in passenger meals was regulated. In 1977 the dispute over sandwich size 
prompted Alfred Kahn, who had just been appointed director of the CAB, to 
wonder “is this what my mother raised me to do?” Kahn, an economist from 




The airline industry was deregulated in several steps, beginning with the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which authorized the CAB to approve 
deviations from regulated fares.
105
 The United States also negotiated several 
“open skies” agreements with foreign countries, allowing greater access by 
foreign carriers into U.S. markets. The CAB itself was abolished in 1984.
106
 
Today, pricing is left to the discretion of each carrier, enforced only by the 
antitrust laws, and then only rarely. No one regulates the size of sandwiches, 
which have largely disappeared in any event. 
The story of telecommunications deregulation is more complex. The 
national telephone system took the first steps in the late 1970s, when the courts 
began to doubt AT&T’s long-held position, supported by the Federal 
Communications Commission, that its network should not be forced to 
interconnect with anyone. Previously, in the 1956 Hush-A-Phone decision the 
FCC had gone so far as to forbid a firm from selling an entirely non-electronic 
plastic cup that fit over a phone mouthpiece so that a caller could whisper into it 
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and keep his words confidential. The appellate court reversed, thus cracking the 




During the 1960s several firms that provided two-way radio services tried 
to interconnect electronically with the AT&T system. Carterfone, a technology 
developed by Thomas Carter, enabled truckers to use Citizens’ Band radio to 
access the phone system to talk to their families or others while on the road. 
AT&T objected to the interconnection, but in 1968 the FCC changed its position 
and permitted Carter to proceed.
108
 The case damaged AT&T’s reputation 
because it publicized the extent to which AT&T’s regulatory actions could 
actually inhibit innovations that consumers wanted. 
In the early 1980s AT&T was to a very significant extent deregulated by 
the antitrust laws rather than legislation. An appellate court held that antitrust law 
required the AT&T network to interconnect with rivals.
109
 MCI, then a very 
young company, was permitted to provide long distance services in competition 
with AT&T. At about the same time AT&T agreed to be broken up in order to 
resolve an antitrust action brought by the government. The decree severed local 
operating companies from long distance.
110
 The principal protagonist was William 
F. Baxter, a Stanford law professor who was head of the Antitrust Division during 
Ronald Reagan’s first term. AT&T also severed its Western Electric division, thus 
ending an era in which purchasers of telephone service were required to lease 
their phones from AT&T. The result was a flood of new entrants into the markets 
for devices such as telephones, fax machines, and the like, and also into long 
distance communications. 
The deregulation movement has not been confined to great New Deal 
edifices. It also included purely local regulation. As initially approved by the 
Supreme Court’s 1926 Euclid decision, zoning involved fairly rigid government 
specifications of land use, with a checkerboard of parallel streets and a strong 
preference for single-family homes.
111
 These earliest zoning statutes were 
“cumulative,” meaning that higher uses excluded lower ones, but not vice versa, 
with single-family homes ranking highest and heavy industry lowest. Beginning 
in the 1950s and 1960s, however, more communities turned to “exclusionary” 
zoning, which excluded in both directions. One significant downside was the 
increased use of zoning to exclude on the basis of wealth or race, mainly by 
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requiring very large lots or eliminating multifamily housing. Some state courts 
overturned these provisions, holding that communities could not use zoning to 
exclude their “fair share” of a regional cross section of the population.
112
 Federal 
law never went that far. 
Zoning regulation historically tied particular parcels of land to specific 
uses. Not only was this process inflexible, it also required planners to be expert 
predictors of future economic development. A great deal of land in rapidly 
growing communities was zoned when it was still being used primarily for 
agriculture. Although deviations were possible, a landowner had to show some 
kind of need or hardship. Beginning in the 1950s, however, some communities 
began to permit areas within the zoned community to “float,” and have their uses 
determined later. Early decisions were skeptical, sometimes exhibiting overt 
hostility to market-driven outcomes. One 1960 decision, widely reprinted in law 
school property casebooks, reflected this antimarket bias: under a floating zone 




Two subsequent initiatives changed the course of urban land use planning 
in the United States. Once was statutes that provided for significantly greater 
flexibility, permitting the market rather than public planners to determine housing 
needs. The other was the dramatic revitalization of “private” zoning-like 
restrictions. The best-known example of the first is the “planned unit 
development,” or PUD, which abandoned the 1920s’ notion that single-family 
homes should be on equal lots located on parallel streets.  The PUD form gave 
private developers the ability to negotiate the layout of planned subdivisions. 
Already in 1949, Prince George’s County, Maryland, authorized two builder-
planned communities, with varying building styles, irregular streets, common land 
areas, and community facilities.
114
 The thinking was that economically interested 
developers had every incentive to make their developments as attractive as 
possible to customers, and thus could be expected to respond better than 
government planners to anticipated housing needs.
115
 The PUD approach 
incidentally favored larger home builders, reflecting a reality in which ever more 
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The other development was the dramatic rise of private restrictive 
covenants, or “servitudes,” as zoning substitutes. The result was the kind of tiny 
markets that Coase had imagined in the Problem of Social Cost. Under a servitude 
system the relevant land use decision could be made by an owners’ association 
that controlled a few units rather than the thousands that might be under a city’s 
zoning board. The popularity of restrictive covenants increased after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Buchanan v. Warley, discussed in Chapter 3, which struck 
down racially exclusive zoning.
117
 Home developers then turned to private 
racially restrictive covenants, which the Supreme Court initially upheld in 
1926.
118
 It changed its mind in 1948 in Shelley v. Kraemer.
119
 Developers also 
began to use private covenants to control other aspects of subdivisions, such as 
housing size, density, placement on lots—many of the same things that zoning 
controlled. In its important 1938 Neponsit decision the New York Court of 
Appeals approved a subdivision covenant scheme that created a private 
homeowner’s association to manage the subdivision and required individual 
property owners to pay an ownership fee.
120
 Neponsit helped create the legal 
framework for private contractual alternatives to zoning. Initially the growth of 
such subdivisions was slow. In 1964 fewer than five hundred subdivisions in the 
United States were managed by private homeowners’ associations. By 2000 the 
number had grown to roughly 225,000.
121
 
The impact of these “private residential governments” is manifold. First, 
often there is more “regulation” as such than even zoning ordinances provide. For 
example, private subdivisions often control building materials, landscaping, pet 
ownership, and permissible uses much more elaborately than zoning typically 
does. At the same time, however, the regulations are both private and contractual, 
in the sense that everyone agrees to them as a condition of buying a home in a 
particular development. In a very real sense residential land use law had moved 
from the public back into the private legal sphere. 
Conclusion 
The legal world in the United States today is more “private” than it was from the 
New Deal through the 1960s. Some of that development was clearly a socially 
beneficial response to regulatory excesses. But democracy’s movements often 
lack moderation. On the way to whatever short-lived equilibrium it may attain, it 
gyrates between extremes. 
Deregulation has had a significant effect on American infrastructure, 
privatizing parts of it and diminishing what is left over. A common complaint 
about expansive regulation is overinvestment in infrastructure. In the early 1960s 
Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson famously argued that because regulated firms 
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are guaranteed a profitable rate of return on their investment they are tempted to 
enlarge the base on which this return is computed. They “gold plate,” or 
overinvest in infrastructure such as pipelines, electric lines, telecommunications, 
and transportation facilities.
122
 Deregulation has largely removed that incentive. 
In sharp contrast, the actors in the markets envisioned by Ronald Coase do not 
invest if they cannot appropriate the results. Although the great public works 
projects of the New Deal era may have given us too many train stations, 
courthouses, universities, schools, highways, or other public facilities, 
privatization has provided too little. And the distributional impact should not be 
forgotten: infrastructure is often of greater benefit to the poor than the wealthy. 
The deregulation of residential communities has had a similar effect. 
Private residential governments have reduced the value of the traditional 
community as a public good. Once the private subdivision has its own private 
park, recreational facilities, and security force, its owners are less likely to vote 
tax increases to support public parks or increase the government’s police force. 
Robert Reich termed this phenomenon “the secession of the successful.”
123
 A few 
courts have relied on esoteric historical rules such as the “public trust” doctrine to 
force subdivisions to open truly scarce facilities to a larger population. For 
example, in 1984 the New Jersey Supreme Court required a private homeowners’ 
association to open its privately owned beach to the public.
124
 
Nonetheless, the deregulation movement has not taken us back to some 
idealized notion of the nineteenth century, although some proponents may long 
for that. Thanks to urbanization and technological development, the world is 
critically more dependent on infrastructure today than it was a century ago. And 
of course the environment is the ultimate infrastructure, because everyone 
participates but each person individually benefits more by corrupting than by 
improving it. For these reasons the deregulation movement may largely have run 
its course, even though some ideological support remains. Infrastructure provides 
the platform on which social and legal systems develop, and societies with better 
platforms have the advantage. The trick is to develop shared resources in ways 
that facilitate economic and social growth for all members of society rather than 
favoring particular interest groups. This is one of the biggest challenges facing 
democratic legal systems in the neoclassical era. 
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